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Shari'ah Compliance Risk
Shaykh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo*
I. INTRODUCTION
In common parlance, risk equates to uncertainty. Regardless of whether the
origin of the word is the Arabic rizq (meaning provision allotted by the
Almighty), as suggested by some scholars, or derived from the Italian risciare, to
dare, the word "risk" points to an element of uncertainty in the future and
especially to the possibility of a variety of outcomes to the decisions that people
make for themselves and others.'
Shari'ah compliance risk is the possibility that a financial service or product
is not or will not be in compliance with established Shari'ah principles and
standards. Financial products and services designed especially for the Islamic
financial marketplace are distinguished from their conventional counterparts by
their compliance with Shari'ah precepts and principles. While these products
and services may appear similar to conventional financial products and services,
particularly from an economic perspective, the contractual and structural
underpinnings of these products and services comply with the Shari'ah.2 Thus,
*
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Shaykh Yusuf DeLorenzo is a scholar of Islamic Law, based in the Washington DC area, who has
served as a Shari'ah advisor for scores of financial entities, including index providers, commercial,
investment and retail banks, commercial and home finance companies, mutual funds, private
equity funds, hedge funds, funds of funds, commodity funds, trade funds, leasing funds and
institutional investors.
Shaykh Yusuf is the author of A Compendium of Legal Opinions on the Operations of Islamic Banks (Inst
of Islamic Banking & Ins 1996), the first English/Arabic reference on the legal rulings issued by
Shari'ah boards. He has also written numerous articles, research papers, and chapters in books on
Islamic finance, including translations of works from Arabic, Persian and Urdu. Shaykh Yusuf
was recently appointed Chief Shariah Officer at Shariah Capital Inc, a US company traded
publicly on the London AIM Exchange.
Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Stor7 of Risk 8 Gohn Wiley 1996); Frank
Wharton, Risk Management: Basic Concepts and General Principles,in Jake Ansell and Frank Wharton,
eds, Risk: Analysis, Assessment andManagement 4 aOohn Wiley 1992).
David E. Upton, Foreword, in Stella Cox, Bryan Kraty, and Abdulkader Thomas, eds, Structuring
Islamic Finance Transactions xi, xv-xvi (Euromoney 2005). Furthermore, an identity of financial
implications should not be considered as a lack of philosophical differences. An example close to
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while a Shari'ah-compliant home finance contract may resemble a conventional
mortgage in many ways, the underlying structure is quite different.3 Simply
stated, while the economics are the same, the mechanics are different.
Shari'ah compliance is what lends a financial product or service its
legitimacy in the Islamic marketplace. Ultimately, Muslim consumers, investors,
and clients are concerned with compliance because the religion restricts
consumption to that which is good and wholesome ("halal 'un tayyib") while
prohibiting what is foul, harmful, unjust, or sinful. A fawa immediately relieves
the ordinary consumer of the burden of having to make that determination for
himself.4 It is from this perspective that the Shari'ah supervisory board ("SSB")
may be viewed as both an auditor (for the company offering the financial service
or product) and a consumer advocate (for the company's clients).
In the hierarchy of risks established for modern financial institutions,
Shari'ah compliance risk may be considered a form of operational and regulatory
risk. Certainly though, Shari'ah compliance assumes that a financial product or
service is already compliant with conventional financial standards and
regulations. Shari'ah compliance should never be understood to mean that a
financial product or service falls outside the norms established for its
conventional market equivalent; certainly not in terms of regulation. In any case,
Shari'ah risk is actually an umbrella risk category beneath which there may be
several subcategories; its management effectively enhances industry best
practices and compliance with jurisdictional standards and regulations.
At a time when interest in Islamic finance is growing, it is important to
understand how Shari'ah-based considerations may impact a business or a
transaction, as well as measuring, classifying, and quantifying the sorts of risks
associated with Shari'ah compliance. Clearly, being able to identify and to
understand Shari'ah compliance risk is an important key to providing a
consistent framework for managing that risk. Emphasizing this importance is the
relatively recent emergence of Islamic finance and its continuing efforts to
develop industry standards and best practices. Indeed, as this Article will explain,
there is much that remains to be accomplished by the industry internally.

home: one daughter marries and has several children, while another daughter lives with a man
"without benefit of clergy" and has several children. There is no practical difference-both
daughters are living with a man and both produce grandchildren. Would you argue that there is
no religious or philosophical difference?
3

For an explanation of the three widely used contracts for home finance, see Virginia Morris and
Abdulkader Thomas, Guide to UnderstandingIslamic Home Financein Accordance with the Islamic Sbariah
(Lightbulb 2002).

4

A fatwa is a formal response to a question by an Islamic legal authority. In modern Islamic
finance, a faiwa is a formal certification of a financial product or service by a qualified Shari'ah
expert, or a group of such experts (also called a Shari'ah supervisory board).
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Shari'ah compliance risk may be classified in terms of the levels of that
risk, the factors that constitute it, and its strategic and tactical management.
Management of Shari'ah compliance risk, like other forms of risk management,
may also be seen as having a lifecycle. The purpose of this Article is to explore
this subject in a preliminary manner, to lay the foundations for its definition, to
describe its characteristics and implications, and to examine how it is presently
managed by Islamic financial institutions. It is the author's hope that this Article
will contribute to an understanding of the subject and lead to more systematic
studies of this area in the future.

II. MANAGING RISK
A risk is a degree of uncertainty. The most important step in managing risk
is the ability to identify and to classify it correctly and appropriately. From that
point forward, the risk can be managed, and if the risk becomes a problem, a
process of resolution can begin. In the modern Islamic finance industry, the
single most important factor in the management of risk is the SSB. These boards
generally consist of three or more Shari'ah scholars with specialized
qualifications in finance and/or economics. They convene for the purpose of
ensuring that financial products and services offered to consumers and investors
are compliant with the rules and principles of the Shari'ah. SSBs often
participate in product research and development and will formally certify
compliance by means of afalwa.
Modern businesses, especially those in the finance industry, employ
multiple strategies to manage risk through identification, categorization, and
mitigation. These strategies may also assist in the establishment of benchmarks
or thresholds with which to assess and measure risk and thus the strategies take
appropriate actions to manage it. Notwithstanding disparities in the size and
sophistication of business activities, the way risk is defined and the language
used to do so are essential elements in the management of risk.
III. ELEMENTS OF SHARI'AH COMPLIANCE:
SHARI'AH SUPERVISORY BOARDS
Present day perceptions of Muslim consumers and investors are such that
in order for a financial product or service to be accepted as Shari'ah compliant,
it must first have the approval of a religious authority.' In some jurisdictions,
regulators now require both an SSB and a fatwa for any company offering
Islamic financial services and products. It is now universally accepted that
5

See generally Abdulkader Thomas, Understanding the Sharia Process, in Cox, Kraty, and Thomas,
eds, StructuringIslamic Finance Transactions32 (cited in note 2).
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without formal approval through certification by means of afawa, no issuer or
product provider will be able to market the financial service or product
successfully to the Islamic financial community. Certification, therefore, signifies
to the Muslim client that a product complies not only with jurisdictional
regulations, but that it has also been subjected to scrutiny by an authority on
Islamic transactional law and is therefore consistent with Shari'ah rules and
standards.
For the successful management of Shari'ah compliance risk, SSBs must
work closely with management and its internal or external counsel throughout
the process of product development. In regard to a completely Shari'ahcompliant company, the SSB will work on every relevant facet of its business
operations, including its capital structure and nature of business. Typically, SSBs
assist in the pre-certification stages, such as product development and
structuring, or in the early stages of operations. Then, the SSB will issue afalwa
to certify the finished product, process, or service. In the case of a Shari'ahcompliant offering, this will take place before an Offering Memorandum or
Prospectus is issued or before a product is introduced to the market. By this
stage, the SSB should have worked with management to identify and to mitigate
all possible Shari'ah compliance risks. Thereafter, the SSB will continue to assist
in the risk management of the product or service.
Throughout the product lifecycle, it is the responsibility of the SSB to work
with management to ensure that everything about the financial product or
service is in compliance with the principles and precepts of the Shari'ah and,
equally as important, to ensure that there is sufficient transparency in the
Shari'ah process so that the product or service is understood by consumers or
investors to be Shari'ah-compliant. Indeed, the Shari'ah process can be complex
and demanding and requires significant attention from product producers and
investment managers. Business, legal, and Shari'ah teams should work together
on projects from the earliest stages to ensure that there are no "false starts" so
the work may proceed smoothly toward a well-identified goal. Such a process,
however, requires dedicated management. All too often, products and processes
are developed without the participation of SSBs, such that proposals are
submitted to SSBs for review, approval, and certification only weeks or days
before a target date for launch. Obviously, truncation of this sort can only spell
difficulty for the product development lifecycle.
However, neither the presence of a fatwa nor an SSB is sufficient to
guarantee complete market acceptance for the Shari'ah compliance of a financial
product or service. Indeed, there is risk associated even with the fatwa and with
the SSB itself. Falwa risk, as will be discussed in more detail below, has to do
with the possibility that the fatwa is ambiguous and will not be understood, that
thefatwa is not sufficiently detailed, or that it is overly concerned with detail and
thus indecipherable to all but those with specialized knowledge. Likewise, there
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is also a risk that an SSB will not be accepted as a qualified authority for giving
an opinion on a particular financial product or service.6 The adage that there are
no guarantees in life is certainly applicable to Islamic finance. However, if
management begins by understanding that there are risks associated with
Shari'ah compliance and then works closely with its SSB to manage those risks,
the path forward will almost always be a smooth one.
Islamic financial institutions found it necessary to consult with specialized
Shari'ah scholars in order to deal with Shari'ah compliance risk. From the early
days of the modern revival of Islamic finance, financial institutions discovered
that the best way to deal with the risk of non-compliance with Shari'ah norms
was by bringing in experts on the Shari'ah rules for transactions to study their
operations, instruments, procedures, and structures. Very soon it was discovered
that the opinions of several scholars, covering a wider range of jurisprudential
thinking, were more likely to receive a positive reception from the bank's
clientele. Soon after, the practice of consulting SSBs became widespread. In the
late 1990s, the Accounting & Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial
Institutions ("AAOIFI") promulgated a standard, mandating that all member
institutions maintain SSBs.7
Institutions with operations at a local or regional level will generally require
an SSB with local or regional membership only. However, once an institution
seeks to do business across borders, the risk that its Shari'ah board members
will not be recognized outside of their home countries is greater. In order to
manage this risk, institutions doing business globally-whether banks, asset
managers, finance companies, or index providers-have established SSBs with
scholars of international repute whose backgrounds cover a broader cultural and
linguistic constituency. Indeed, the membership of such multinational SSBs will
represent not only the major schools of jurisprudence, but the chief geographical
regions in the Muslim world as well.
Factors that influence the selection of scholars for an SSB generally include
their: (1) public reputations as academics; (2) relevant honors and titles; (3)
advisory roles with public institutions; (4) publications (especially on the subject
of Islamic finance); (5) membership on the Shari'ah boards of reputable
international financial institutions; (6) their academic backgrounds and other
fundamental qualifications like facility in both the English and Arabic languages,
6

7

In many cases, the investor/client will have its own Shari'ah supervisory board, or Shari'ah
advisor. It is possible that the investor SSB will reject thefatwa issued by the product developer.
This Article will discuss possible reasons for such rejection.
In 1998, the AAOIFI promulgated a standard, Auditing Standard for Islamic Financial
Institutions ("ASIFI"), regarding the definition, appointment, composition, and reports of SSBs.
This has now been adopted by financial regulators in several Middle Eastern and, in particular,
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") countries.
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and appreciation for the broader social and economic contexts of Islamic
Finance; and (7) availability. In recent years, as demand for such scholars has
continued to grow, this particular consideration has taken on added significance.
In businesses that require quick decisions-securities trading, private equity, and
the like-the issue of accessibility can be crucial.
IV.

ELEMENTS OF SHARI'AH COMPLIANCE: THE FATWA

It is widely assumed that afawa is all that is required to open the doors to
Islamic financial markets all over the world. The reality of the matter is a little
different. While the risk of market rejection is certainly mitigated by the issuance
of afatwa, it is not a guarantee for success. Commercial practice among modern
Islamic financial institutions dictates that a fatwa precede or accompany the
marketing and release of products, and the fawa has become a condition
precedent for most, if not all, Shari'ah-compliant investments. At the same time,
however, even though a fatwa is directed toward a variety of stakeholders, there
is always a risk that a fatwa will not satisfy everyone, and that, in spite of
Shari'ah-board certification, people will reject the SSB's finding that the product
offered is compliant with Shari'ah rules. Obviously, when this happens at the
consumer or investor level, there is a serious problem.
A. FATWA RISK: REJECTION

In order to be prepared to mitigate the risk offatwa rejection, it is necessary
to understand why such rejection is possible. Though rare, there are many
reasons consumers reject a fatwa. Possible reasons for such rejection may
include: (1) differences of legal philosophy in cases where a Shari'ah board bases
its fatwa on the opinion of a minority legal school or an obscure jurist in a
minority legal school; (2) lack of disclosure resulting from a fatwa that fails to
include the level of detail required by investors and their Shari'ah boards; (3)
failure of an investor Shari'ah board to comprehend the operations or structures
described in afatwa issued by the SSB of an investment product, either because
the fatwa fails to explain them appropriately or because the investor Shari'ah
board is simply unfamiliar with the concepts involved and elects to be prudent
by rejecting the fatwa; and (4) rejection by consumers who feel that a fatwa has
not adequately addressed their concerns regarding religious compliance. In
practical terms, if these risks are to be managed effectively, management will
have to work closely with the members of its SSB to ensure that the Shari'ah

VoZ 7 No. 2

Shari'ah Compliance Ri'sk

DeLoren.Zo

process is carefully managed.8 Such management includes control of the fatwa's
content, language, signatories, distribution, and preservation.
While the principles and precepts of the Shari'ah on the subject of finance
are widely acknowledged, the industry has nonetheless labored to develop
Shari'ah standards. Honesty, transparency, honoring contracts, meeting
obligations, dealing fairly with others, and reward following the assumption of
responsibility (for loss) are all high-level principles of transacting in compliance
with the Shari'ah. They find expression in any number of texts, including the
Qur'an and the Sunnah.9 Likewise, the prohibitions against usury and interest,
profiteering, cheating, ambiguity in contracts, investing in sin industries, and the
like are also well known. Even so, as texts may be interpreted differently, there is
always the possibility that afatwa may be rejected when it is found to be based
on disputed legal premises. Thus, management of the entire Shari'ah processfrom the development phase, which is often conceptual in nature and thus open
to interpretation, to thefatwa stage and beyond-is an essential part of managing
Shari'ah compliance risk. Obviously, informed management of such a process
will be a positive factor in the management of Shari'ah compliance risk.
A negative finding in relation to a financial product or service may come in
the form of a formal rejection by an SSB when it refuses to certify the product
or service by means of afawa. The refusing SSB, however, may be affiliated with
the product developer or manager, so that the rejection is internal and addressed
outside of the public eye. On the other hand, the rejection may come from an
SSB affiliated with an investor or consumer entity. In some instances, a rejection
may come from an independent Shari'ah authority, like a muffi, an imam, or a
community leader, sometimes in the form of a website declaration. Such
rejections may lead to general rejection by the consuming public. Ultimately, the

8

9

In fact, while it is not at all common at the present time, I believe that in the future an increasing
number of businesses offering Shari'ah-compliant financial products and services will employ
Shari'ah experts as executives for the management of their Shari'ah processes. Such executives
may play a key role in ensuring the Shari'ah compliance of all operations by working alongside the
SSB, by assessing the feasibility of proposals at the initial stages, and by assisting in project
development and execution. Obviously, as a member of the management team, such an expert
would have to recuse himself from actually signing afatwa. Even so, like in-house legal counsel,
such an executive would add immense value to the specialized nature of Shari'ah-compliant
business. In this manner, the company will abide by the internationally recognized standards for
Shari'ah supervision set by AAOIFI while maintaining an interested, in-house Shari'ah capability
of its own.
See, for example, Qur'an 5:1 ("0 you who believe! Honor all contracts"); Qur'an 4:29 ("Do not
devour one another's possessions wrongfully--not even by way of trade based on mutual
agreement"). The texts of the Sunnah, the doings and sayings of the Prophet, upon him be peace,
are usually more specific; though these too may be general in nature.
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risk of such rejection is that the issuer will be unable to find a ready market for
its product.
If the Shari'ah process is well-managed, rejection can be prevented by
anticipating the impact of a product on the target market, investor, or investor
SSB. If necessary, the chair of the issuing SSB will contact either the chair of the
investor SSB that will consider the fatwa or a member of the investor SSB with
whom there is a relationship, and the two will attempt to come to an
understanding that will satisfy both sides. In fact, the more prudent course in
such situations is to arrange for such a meeting or conversation well in advance
of submission to the investor SSB for its formal approval. In these instances,
collegial relations between Shari'ah scholars clearly play an important role in
determining a mutually agreeable solution. In some cases, it is best if such a
meeting is also attended by management and legal counsel for the product
developer. In this way, every aspect of the transaction may be discussed.
At times, a developer may incur considerable research and development
costs for a new product, including costs directly related to Shari'ah compliance
and, in order to retain first-to-market status for the business, will insist on
keeping the fatwa out of the public eye for a time. Obviously, there is
considerable risk in such a strategy. While the rewards for first movers may be
greater, there must first be a clear understanding of how to manage the Shari'ah
process. Otherwise, despite the obvious economic advantages of the product,
the market may not be ready to accept it. This is especially true of more exotic
and complex investment and liquidity management products.
B. JURISTIC DIFFERENCES
Among the factors potentially contributing to the risk of fatwa rejection is
the matter of juristic differences among the major schools of jurisprudence.
Indeed, while the classical schools agree on the great majority of issues, there are
differences, even in their legal methodology, which could lead to significantly
different findings.' 0 This is especially true with regard to financial products and
services for which there is no precedent or clear ruling from the classical texts.
Perhaps this preliminary study is not the place to discuss particulars.
However, there is a growing need to address the jurisprudential differences
between SSBs in the Arabian Gulf and those in Malaysia. Such a discussion
should be carried out on a number of different levels, but most Shari'ah scholars
10

For an informative modern study of this matter in the classical schools of jurisprudence, see
Umar Kahhala, Athr Ikbilafal-Usual 'ala'l-Furu(Daral-Fikr 1969). As yet, no such study has been
undertaken with reference to the rulings of SSBs. It is likely, however, that such a study will prove
especially valuable as the industry moves forward. Beginning with case studies, concerted research
may soon lead to comprehensive and systematic studies.
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involved in the modern Islamic finance industry as Shari'ah board members
would agree that the discussion should begin at a very high academic level so as
to begin the discussion far from commercial considerations. Indeed, the
government of Malaysia is to be commended for taking a positive first step in
this direction when it convened an international conference of Shari'ah scholars
in 2005 and then announced the establishment of the International Centre for
Education in Islamic Finance, a graduate-level teaching institution.
Certainly, one factor in such differences of opinion is the lack of precedent
in the classical corpus of Islamic law,fiqh, for the contracts underlying many of
the products, services, structures, and processes used in modern Islamic finance.
While the early generations of Muslims were accomplished merchants and
traders who produced volumes of legal thought on the subject of commerce and
transacting, the world has changed, and the law is only now beginning to catch
up. There is certainly nothing novel in this situation. As the world changes, so
also does the interpretation and application of the law. For example, British and
American common law notions of the classical "freedom of contract" have
undergone several significant changes in the past half century alone.' 2 The inner
dynamic of ijihad is what allows Islamic law to renew itself continually and to
adapt itself to changing circumstances. Derived from the same Arabic triliteral
root as jihad, j-h-d, the meaning of ijtihadis the expending of the utmost effort
in the exercise of legal scholarship. While the scriptural foundations of Islamic
transactional law may be abbreviated (owing to their delineation of principles rather
than specifics), the dynamic of ihad inherent to fiqh has ensured that Muslim
jurists continue to comment and to build upon the theoretical constructs. 3
What the fiqh offers is a learned point of departure and, perhaps most
importantly, a comprehensive and complex methodology for legal interpretation
and application. Modern SSBs are beginning to employ a more proactive and
participatory jurisprudence of innovation and transformation by reconfiguring
the nominate contracts 14 or, perhaps more exactly, by thinking of the nominate

1
12
13
14

See Malaysia-The International Islamic Financial Centre Issuers & Investors Forum (Aug 14, 2006),
available online at <htrp://www.inceif.org/discover/media-room/news/article/arcide.php?
intPrefLangID= 1&&intArticleID=2> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
See W. David Slawson, Binding Promises: The Late 2Otb-Centugy Reformation of Contract Law 9-21
(Princeton 1996).
Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo, The Religious Foundations of Islamic Finance, in Simon Archer and Rifaat
Ahmed Abdel Karim, eds, Islamic Finance:Innovation and Growth 9, 24 (Euromoney 2002).
The nominate contracts, or al-'uqud al-musammab, are those contracts which found currency in the
classical period of Islam and which therefore received specific mention and treatment in the
classical manuals of law. With reference to contracts other than those named (non-nominates),
Islamic law operates on the principle that all contracts are to be allowed as long as these are not
contrary to Islamic legal precepts. See Wahba al-Zuhayli, 4 al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatub 242 (Dar
al-Fikr 1989).
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contracts as building blocks that may be constituted and constructed creatively
for the achievement of all manner of financial and contractual objectives.
Modern SSBs have engineered and approved a host of hybrid nominates, using a
single nominate such as murabahah in different configurations (such as parallel
murabahah, reverse murabahah, back-to-back murabahah, and reverse-parallel
murabahah contracts), or by using a plurality of nominate contracts in
combination with one another. In this manner, the nominate mainstays of
classical Islamic commercial law, musharakab, iarah,salam, islisna'a,mudarabah, and
others have been transformed and adapted in a variety of ways to modern needs
and circumstances." An example is the adaptation of these contracts to bring
about interest-free alternatives to conventional mortgages for the financing of
homes. In other cases, these derivatives became key elements in investment
funds, project finance, and, most recendy, in Islamic debt instruments like
sukuk. 6
Likewise, contracts described in the classical fqh formed the basis for
sophisticated trade practices throughout the Indian Ocean region for centuries,
including, for example, an advance finance contract system that was adapted by
the Europeans as a "putting-out" model when they arrived to trade in the
region. 7 What modern Shari'ah boards may derive from such a model, based on
the salam sale nominate, is a point of departure for the consideration of such
modern ways of contracting as deferred sales, futures, and options.
To a significant degree, the efforts of the AAOIFI and the Islamic
Financial Services Board have helped to bring about and to publicize standards
for the industry, including Shari'ah standards. 8 Such standards, however wellformulated, sometimes lag behind developments in the marketplace. Consider,
however, in regard to sukuk, how the promulgation of the Shari'ah standards for
sukuk effectively initiated that industry. There is clearly a greater risk for
structures, instruments, and transactions that are not yet covered by AAOIFI
standards. If something is new to the market, it will be new to SSBs. Structured
15

Yusuf DeLorenzo and Michael McMillan, Law and Islamic Finance: An Interactive Analysis, in Rifaat

16

Ahmed Abdel Karim and Simon Archer, eds, Islamic Finance:The Regulatory Challenge 136, 153 (John
Wiley 2007).
See Abdulkader Thomas and Nathif Adam, Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring and

17

Investing in Sukuk (Euromoney 2004).
K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Citisationin the Indian Ocean:An Economic Historyfrom the Rise of Islam to

18

1750 200-01 (Cambridge 1985). See also Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The
World System A.D. 1250-1350 216-24 (Oxford 1989) (discussing Islamic commercial history,
including contract practices).
Full information regarding these two organizations may be obtained from their websites:
Accounting & Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, available online at
<http://www.aaoifi.com> (visited Jan 15, 2007); and Islamic Financial Services Board, available
online at <http://www.ifsb.org> (visited Jan 15, 2007).
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principal protection products, for example, were first developed for the Islamic
financial market following the burst of the dotcom stock market bubble in
2000-2001."9 At first glance, structured principal protection products appeared
to contravene the Shari'ah principle of reward following responsibility for loss,
as well as several others. Accordingly, many SSBs were hesitant at first to accept
the structures underlying such products. Once they became more common, and
SSBs had studied and grown familiar with them, general acceptance followed.
V. CONCLUSION
Philosophical differences, or what might be considered purely
jurisprudential issues, will play a part in the decisions of SSBs. For example, the
Shari'ah is concerned with social justice. In the marketplace, the role of the
Shari'ah is prominent because the business of earning a living concerns
everyone, as individuals, as groups within society, and as citizens of nations and
the world. The logic of the relevant Islamic teachings is that everyone will
benefit when people earn their living in a wholesome and lawful manner and
social stability is supported by commercial society. Thus, at the core of Islamic
finance are religious precepts governing what is good and permitted, or lawful,
and what is harmful and forbidden, or unlawful. It is the responsibility of the
SSB jurist to help distinguish the one from the other. 2° As markets grow in
sophistication and transactions become increasingly complex, that responsibility
becomes more and more challenging. Differences of opinion are, therefore,
bound to occur.2' Careful management of the Shari'ah process will almost
certainly help prevent this risk from becoming a problem.
Risk is a part of business; without it, business cannot exist. Total aversion
to risk equates to taking no chances and to making no choices, thus creating a
19

Such products obviously differ in significant ways from the conventional capital guaranteed

20

products that they effectively emulate from an economic perspective.
While examples abound, it may be instructive to cite a recentfatwa by an SSB in Saudi Arabia

21

which gave approval to investments in a company with a network of retail clothing stores,
including brands that are well known for advertisements that feature scantily clad models,
sometimes in suggestive poses. The SSB gave its approval on the basis that the business of the
retailer was the sale of clothing, while the advertising was done not by the retailer but by the
designers. The approving SSB included at least one scholar who rejected investments in an
advertising firm for the reason that it was producing advertisements that featured scantily clad
models. See Islamic Scholars Sancion Trading ofAlhokair IPO Shares (Oct 9, 2006), available online at
<http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20061009110125/Seclndustries/paglslamic/
0
20Finance/chnMiddle%2
OEast%20Islamic%20Finance%20News/objDDA417C3-600D-1 1D686D700D074A002D/> (visited Jan 15, 2007). On the other hand, SSBs regularly reject
investments in warehouses or transport companies if the majority of their revenues are derived
from contracts to store or to transport alcohol.
DeLorenzo and McMillan, Law and Islamic Finance at 141 (cited in note 15).
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state of inertia and stagnation. By facing risk and learning to manage it, people
have advanced themselves and society. The same is true of Shari'ah compliance
risk. If it is intelligently and appropriately managed, Shari'ah-compliant finance
will thrive and advance.
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